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THE ATTORNEY'S LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE
JOHN W. WADE*

The concept of negligence was late in developing in the common
law. Perhaps the first group of cases in which the idea began to take
shape involved the liability of persons who professed competence in
certain callings.' One of these "callings" was that of the attorney,
and cases as early as the middle of the eighteenth century hold an
2
attorney liable on this basis.
But the judges were obviously convinced that they must be careful not to impose too heavy a burden upon the members of their own
profession. Though an attorney (or solicitor) might be liable, a counsel (or barrister) was not subject to liability for negligence.3 The
attorney was liable only for "culpable negligence,"'4 and he was not
responsible for mistakes. 5 As Abbott, C. J., fervently declared irr an
early case, "God forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney,
or a counsel, or even a judge is bound to know all the law. .

.

."6 No

reference is made to the apparent inconsistency with the old maxim
that everyone is presumed to know the law.7 The judicial determina* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. See generally Winfield, The History of Negligence in Torts, 42 L.Q- REV.
184, 185-90 (1926).

2. Thus in 1767, there were two holdings of the King's Bench to this effect.

Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767); Russell v. Palmer,
2 Wils. K. B. 325, 95 Eng. Rep. 837 (K.B. 1767). At an earlier time it was
necessary to allege "covin." Adams v. Ward, Winch 91, 124 Eng. Rep. 76
(C.P. 1625).
3. See Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 2061, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767) - This
is specifically held in the later case of Purves v. Landell, 12 Cl. & F. 91, 8
Eng. Rep. 1332 (H.L. Sc. 1845). See also Fell v. Brown, Peake 131, 170 Eng.
Rep. 104 (N.P. 1791).
4. See the more detailed discussion of this later.
5. In the first important decision, Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 20B1, 98
Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767), Lord Mansfield is quoted: "That part of the profession which is carried on by attornies is liberal and reputable, as well as
useful to the public, when they conduct themselves with honour and integrity:
and they ought to be protected where they get to the best of their skill and
knowledge. But every man is liable to error: and I should be very sorry
that it should be taken for granted, that an attorney is answerable for every
error or mistake ....
"
6. Montriou v. Jefferys, 2 Car. & P. 113, 116, 172 Eng. Rep. 51, 53 (N.P. a825).
7. "[Alttorneys do not profess to know all the law or to be incapable of
error or mistake in applying it to the facts of every case, as even the most
skillful of the profession would hardly be able to come up to that standard."

Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 199 (1880).

"No man is supposed to

know any branch of the law perfectly, particularly when called on to act
at once, and without time for reflection. The knowledge which we use the
utmost industry to acquire, is often forgotten at the moment when most
needed. The science is a most extensive and difficult one. Cases frequently
occur, when learned men differ, after the greatest pains is taken to arive at
a correct result. No one, therefore, would dare to pursue the profession, if
he was held responsible for the consequences of a casual failure of his memory, or a mistaken course of reasoning." Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. (O.S.)
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tion to protect lawyers against undue responsibility is evidenced by
numerous statements,8 and only one case has been found in which
the court openly declared that suits of this nature should be encouraged.9
. The attorney's liability for negligence arises out of the attorneyclient relationship. This relationship is created through a contract.
Is the action for damages one for breach of contract or one for tort?
The question has not troubled the courts often and there has been
little discussion of it.1° If the action is treated as one in tort, the court
is concerned to find present the various elements of a cause of action
in negligence, and the fact that the duty to use care arises out of a
contract normally has no immediate significance. If the action is
treated as one in contract, the court simply declares that the attorney
"impliedly contracts" to exercise the degree of care, skill and knowledge which would be required by the negligence standard. 1 Thus the
353, 374 (La. 1821). "Finally, it is simply not true that the lawyer makes
any pretense about 'knowing' the statutes and decisions of his state. At most
he represents that he knows where and how to look for them and that he
will do everything necessary to find the pertinent parts." Isaacs, Liability of
the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 39, 42 (1935). "The profession
of the law would be the most hazardous of all professions, if those who practice it in any of its branches were to be held strictly accountable for the accuracy of their opinions." Alexander v. Small, 2 U.C.Q.B. 298, 300 (1846).
8. Three examples will suffice:
Lord Campbell, in speaking of erroneous opinions: "Against the barrister in
England and the advocate in Scotland, luckily, no action can be maintained.
But against the attorney, the professional adviser, or the procurator, an action
may be maintained. But it is only if he has been guilty of gross negligence,
because it would be monstrous to say that he is responsible for even falling
into what must be considered a mistake." Purves v. Landell, 12 Cl. & F. 91,
103, 8 Eng. Rep. 1332, 1337 (H.L. Sc. 1845).
Sherwood, C. J., in Babbitt v. Bumpus, 73 Mich. 331, 41 N.W. 417, 419
(1889): A lawyer is not required to use more than ordinary skill. Any other
rule would subject him "to the vagaries and imaginations of witnesses and
jurors, and not infrequently to the errors committed by courts. This the law
never has done; and the fact that the best lawyers in the country find themselves mistaken as to what the law is, and are constantly differing as to the
application of the law to a given state of facts, and even the ablest jurists
find themselves frequently differing as to both, shows both the fallacy and
danger of any other doctrine ......
Stone, J., in Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 495 (1857): "If
. . . members of the legal profession were held accountable for the consequences of each act which may be pronounced an error by the courts of the
country, no one, I apprehend, would be found rash enough to incur such fearful risks."
9. Frazer, J., in Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435, 436 (1868): "An attorney
is always liable to his client for the consequences of his ignorance, carelessness, or unskillfulness, just as a physician is for his malpractice; and we cannot forbear remarking that a few suits of the kind, judiciously distributed
through this State, might, by making this principle of law more publicly
known, have some tendency to relieve the community of the consequences
which have resulted from that section of the state constitution which allows
every voter, who can prove a good moral character, to pracice law in all our
courts."
10. See generally PRoSsER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in
SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS, ch. 7 (1954).
11. Cf. Erle, C. J., in Fish v. Kelley, 17 C.B. (N.S.) 194, 206, 144 Eng. Rep.
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issues arising are essentially the same under both actions, and except
for the issue of whether privity of contract is necessary for a duty to
use care to arise, there are comparatively few questions where the
form of the action is likely to affect the answer. 12 There are several
13
statements to the effect that an action can be brought on either basis.
For the purposes of this article the action will be treated as if it were
in tort for negligence, and the article itself will be divided according
to the necessary elements for a cause of action in negligence.
DUTY
The relationship of attorney and client gives rise to the duty to use
care and skill and to display a requisite legal knowledge.
There have been some suggestions that the duty does not arise unless there was a binding contract with a valid consideration. 14 But
as the Virginia court said in the first reported case in this country,
"The most complete answer to the objection [that there was no allegation of consideration] is, that the appellee undertook to conduct the
suit, and in his management of it, was guilty of such a neglect of his
duty as to subject the plaintiff to a loss; after this it is not competent
to him to allege a want of consideration.' 5 Thus, an attorney serving
78, 83 (C.P. 1864): "So in the case of one who holds out a certain profession,
the law supposes him to be of competent skill, and he is responsible for any
failure in that respect .... From the holding out, the law implies a contract
or a duty to exert competent and reasonable skill.... In these cases a duty
often arises beyond the contract which the law implies. But I am unable to
perceive any duty arising out of the casual -conversation here." And see
National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1879); Goodman & Mitchell
v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857); Stimpson v. Sprague, 6 Me. 470 (1830); Cochran
v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 Atl. 698 (1889).
12. There are some questions which are so affected-e.g., limitation of
actions, set-off. These will be treated individually in the appropriate places.
13. E.g., Viscount Haldane, L. C., in Nocton v. Lord Asburton, [1914] A.C.
936, 956 (H.L.): "My Lords, the solicitor contracts with his client to be skilful
and careful. For failure to perform his obligation he may be made liable at
law in contract or even in tort, for negligence in breach of a duty imposed
upon him."
Tindall, C. J., in Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q.B. 511, 525, 114 Eng. Rep. 603, 608
(1842): "That there is a large class of cases in which the foundation of the
action springs out of privity of contract between the parties, but in which,
nevertheless, the remedy for the breach, or non-performance, is indifferently
either assumpsit or case upon tort, is not disputed. Such are actions against
attorneys, surgeons, and other professional men, for want of competent skill
or proper care in the service they undertake to render. .. "
14. Cf. Cavillaud v. Yale, 3 Cal. 108, 58 Am. Dec. 388 (1853) (failure to

prosecute appeal payment in advance treated as condition precedent);

Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872) (implication of no liability for gratuitous

act); Eccles v. Stephenson, 6 Ky. 517 (1814) (allegation that defendant under-

took suit for fee sufficient without allegation of payment).

15. Stephens v. White, 2 Wash. 203, 210 (Va. 1796); Glenn v. Haynes,

191 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509 (1951). See also Donaldson v. Haldane, 6 Cl. & F.
762, 7 Eng. Rep. 1258 (H.L. Sc. 1840) (attorney who volunteered his services
is liable for negligence); French v. Armstrong, 80 N.J.L. 152, 76 Atl. 336
(1910) (no need to allege that fee paid).
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without fee in a charity case may be liable for negligence. 16 This
should not be taken to mean that an attorney who casually gives curbstone advice to a friend is liable for wrong advice. Under such circumstances he is not treated as undertaking to meet the standard of
7
care involved in the attorney-client relationship.
One who holds himself out as an attorney is under a duty to demonstrate the standard of skill to which an attorney is held,18 even though
he is not qualified to practice law. If he does not purport to be an
attorney but merely undertakes to use his own best skill and ability
in performing a legal task, a person who knows this cannot hold him
to a higher standard. 19
An attorney who commences his relationship with a client may be
liable in negligence for abandoning the client at a critical stage.2 0
If an attorney performs services for his client and as a result of his
negligence a third person is injured, can that person maintain an
action against him for damages? Until contemporary times the answer
has been a resounding no; privity of contract has been regarded as
a categoric necessity. The House of Lords spoke first in 1861, Lord
Campbell declaring that he "never had any doubt of the unsoundness
of the doctrine" that the third party could recover. "I am clearly of
16. The fact that a barrister has no legal right to be paid a fee for his services is sometimes given as the basis for the rule that he is not liable for negli-

gence, though a solicitor is subject to liability. In theory his employment
"is a purely voluntary one." See EDDY, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 22 (1955);
Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford, 5 H. & N. 890, 157 Eng. Rep. 1436 (Ex. 1860).
But a solicitor who volunteers his services and charges no fee is still liable.
Donaldson v. Haldane, 6 Cl. & F. 762, 7 Eng. Rep. 1258 (H. L. Sc. 1840). In
Leslie v. Ball, 22 U.C.Q.B. 512 (1863), the same man acted as attorney and
barrister under the Canadian practice, and was held liable.
17. See Fish v. Kelly, 17 C.B. (N.S.) 194, 144 Eng. Rep. 78, 83 (C.P. 1864).

Plaintiff casually asked defendant as to his rights under a deed which defendant had earlier drawn up for plaintiff's employer. From an erroneous recollection, defendant replied. He was held not liable on the ground that there
was neither a contract nor a legal duty. "I am unable to find any relation
between the parties from which any duty could arise. .

.

. They did not,

therefore, stand in such a relation towards each other as to make it any part
of the defendant's duty to give professional advice to the plaintiff ...
If this sort of action could be maintained, it would be extremely hazardous

for an attorney to venture to give an opinion upon any point of law in the
course of a journey by railway." 17 C.B. (N.S.) at 205, 207. See also McGregor
v. Wright, 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931). "The test in these cases

should be whether the attorney has held himself out as one who is applying

his professional skill to help the other party, rather than merely giving ad-

vice as a friend." Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for

Negligence, 19 BROoKLYN L. REv. 233, 243 (1953).
18. Miller v. Whelan, 158 Ill. 544, 42 N.E. 59 (1895); Foulks v. Falls, 91 Ind.

315 (1883); Brown v. Tolley, 31 L.T. 485 (C. P. 1874).
19. Morris v. Muller, 113 N.J.L. 46, 172 Atl. 63 (1934) (real estate broker
preparing a chattel mortgage, question of fact as to his undertaking); cf.

Wakeman v. Hazleton, 3 Barb. Ch. 148 (N.Y. 1848) ("more than doubtful"
whether there can be recovery from one hired to foreclose a mortgage when
he was known to be unauthorized to practice in equity).
20. Cf. Howard v. McCarson, 215 Ala. 251, 110 So. 296 (1926); Rohr v.
Chicago, N. S. & M. R. R., 179 Wis. 106, 199 N.W. 827 (1922).
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the opinion that this is not the law of Scotland, nor of England, and
it can hardly be the law of any country where jurisprudence has
been cultivated as a science." 21 The U.S. Supreme Court followed soon
afterwards, with a similar opinion,22 and other cases were to the same
effect.23
This position is of course impelled if the action is based on breach
of contract, and even in the negligence action, the requirement of
privity of contract has held its pristine vigor. But during the past year
the California Supreme Court has rendered a strong opinion in the
case of Biakanjav. Irving,24 which consciously repudiates the requirement. A notary, improperly acting as an attorney, drew up a will
which was inadequately witnessed and therefore void. In holding that
the intended beneficiary could recover, the court said:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves
the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of
harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct and
the policy of preventing future harm.2
This decision thus carries the "assault upon the citadel of privity"2

against another bastion which has hitherto been impregnable. It is
likely to have a substantial effect in other states and to rank with a
number of other leading decisions which have eliminated the requirement of privity in other fields of endeavor. 27 But the prediction seems
21. Robertson v. Fleming, 4 Macq. 167, 177, 10 Scots Rev. Rep. 447 (H.L.Sc.
1861). See also Rae v. Meek, 14 App. Cas. 558 (H.L.Sc. 1889); and cf. Moss v.
Solomon, 1 F. & F. 342, 175 Eng. Rep. 756 (N.P. 1858).
22. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). Chief Justice
Waite dissented.
23. Dundee Mtge. & Trust Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 20 Fed. 39 (C.C.Ore. 1884);
Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895) ; Mickel v. Murphey, 147 Cal.
App. 2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957); Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d
312 (1943); see Re Fitzpatrick, 54 Ont. L.R. 3, 8, [1914] D.L.R. 981 (1923)
(dictum). The case of Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 Pac. 265
(1930), could possibly be regarded as contrary, but the court did not treat the
problem. Cf. Ward v. Arnold, 328 P.2d 164 (Wash. 1958). The fact that the
attorney's fee was paid by another person is not controlling in this connection.
Arnold v. Robertson, 3 Daly 298 (N.Y.C.P. 1870).
24. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), 11 VAND. L. REV. 599, 12 ARK. L. REV.
413, 27 FOHRHAm L. REV. 290, 72 HAuv. L. REv. 380, 7 KAN. L. REV. 83, 11 OKLA.
L. REV. 473, 19 U. PrTT. L. REv. 811, 5 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 681.
25. 320 P.2d at 19.
26. "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days
apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of juridical
discussion." Cardozo, C. J., in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
27. E.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public
weighers); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931)
(public accountants); Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948) (independent contractors). The original leading case in this connection is, of course,

1760
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safe that the ambit of an attorney's liability for negligence for the
near future will be confined to persons who were in his contemplation
at the time he rendered his services, or could at least have been easily
foreseen by him to be directly affected by his conduct.
BFEACH OF DuTY
There has been universal agreement that a lawyer is not an insurer
or guarantor of the correctness of his work or of the results which will
be attained.28 He is liable only for negligent failure to use the requisite care or skill.
The early cases frequently stated that the attorney is liable only for
gross negligence or gross ignorance-often using the Latin phrases,
lata culpa and crassa negligentia. This has sometimes been regarded
as laying down a different standard of care from that expressed by
ordinary negligence. A study of the early English cases, however,
raises considerable doubt if a distinction was really intended. This
was the formative period of the negligence concept, and the terminology had not become conventional. In the first case where the matter
was discussed, Lord Mansfield used the two Latin expressions and
referred to gross negligence and ignorance, but his language later in
the opinion indicates that he was simply trying to describe "a culpable negligence"-negligence of the type which involves fault.2D
In 1830 Chief Justice Tindall declared that:
It would be extremely difficult to define the exact limit by which the
skill and diligence which an attorney undertakes to furnish in the conduct of a cause is bounded; or to trace precisely the dividing line between
that reasonable skill and diligence which appears to satisfy his undertaking, and that crassa negligentia, or lata culpa mentioned in some of
the cases, for which he is undoubtedly responsible. 30
There is no indication that a gap may exist between the exercise of
reasonable skill and diligence on the one hand and gross negligence
on the other; the failure to exercise such skill and diligence was apparently regarded as amounting to gross negligence.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (manufacturers).
28. See, e.g., Purves v. Landell, 12 Cl. & F. 91, 102, 8 Eng. Rep. 1332
(H.L.Sc. 1845) ("The professional adviser has never been supposed to guarantee the soundness of his advice"); McCartney v. Wallace, 214 Ill. App. 618,
624 (1919) ("Attorneys do not guarantee that their judgment is infallible,
and are not necessarily negligent because they do not discover all decisions on
a subject or may question their finality"). For other cases, see 1 THORNTON,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, § 313 (1914). If an attorney by contract guarantees the

correctness of his work, the action would then be on the contract.
29. Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767). See Lord
Ellenborough's similar treatment inBaikie v.Chandress, 3 Camp. 17, 170 Eng.
Rep.1291 (N.P.1811).
30. Godefroy v.Dalton, 6 Bing. 460, 467-68, 130 Eng.Rep. 1357 (C.P. 1830).
As late as 1920, Lord Justice Scrutton quoted a part of this statement and
indicated his agreement as to the difficulty in drawing the "precise line."
Fletcher & Son v. Jubb, Booth & Helliwell, [1920] 1 K.B. 275, 280-81 (C.A.).
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A few years later Baron Rolfe made his famous statement that he
"could see no difference between negligence and gross negligencethat it was the same thing, with the addition of a vituperative epithet. ....-31 Some decisions of the House of Lords at this time laid
emphasis on the distinction and others ignored it. 32
In the meantime the gross-negligence terminology crossed the
33
Atlantic, and there were numerous state decisions which used it.
Some of them apparently treated it literally; and others, somewhat
more sophisticated, indicated an awareness of the special meaning
it had in this connection.34 In any event, the decisions have now either
been overruled or explained away,3 and on both sides of the Atlantic
the term "gross" no longer complicates the statement of the standard
of care required of a lawyer.36
31. Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 115-16, 152 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1843).

The case involved the liability of a defendant who rode a horse gratuitously
for the plaintiff and let him fall on slippery ground. Rolfe had instructed the
jury that they were to determine whether it was "culpable negligence" to
ride the horse on the slippery ground and added that defendant, being shown
to be skilled in the management of horses, was bound to take as much care
as if he had borrowed it. Parke explained parts of Rolfe's instruction thus:
"The whole effect of what was said by the learned Judge as to the distinction
between this case and that of a borrower, was this: that this particular defendant, being in fact a person of competent skill, was in effect in the same
situation as that of a borrower, who in point of law represents that he is a
person of competent skill. In the case of a gratuitous bailee, where his profession or situation is such as to imply the possession of competent skill, he
is equally liable for the neglect to use it." Id. at 115, 152 Eng Rep. at 738. The
term "gross negligence" had customarily been used regarding a gratuitous
bailee as well as a member of a learned profession. Occasionally it had been
used regarding the conduct of an ordinary individual. See the fanfous case
of Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 467, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837),
holding that the test for negligence is objective, not subjective.
32. Compare Purves v. Landell, 12 Cl. & F. 91, 8 Eng. Rep. 1332 (H.L.Sc.
1845), with Hart v. Frame, 6 Cl. & F. 193, 7 Eng. Rep. 670 (H.L.Sc. 1839).
"Crassanegligentia then just means failure to use such skill as may be reasonably expected from a man's profession ... or average diligence and skill."
Professional Negligence, 1955 ScoTs. L.T. 145, 146. In speaking of the negligence of a solicitor in Simmons v. Pennington & Son, [1955] 1 All E.R. 240,
245 (C.A.), Hodson, L. J., said, "'Crass' and other adjectives attached to
'negligence' are no longer used."
33. E.g., Suydam v. Vance, 23 Fed. Cas. 477 (No. 13, 657) (C.C.N.D. Ind.
1840); Evans v. Watrous, 2 Port. 205 (Ala. 1835); Pennington's Ex'rs v. Yell,
11 Ark. 212, 52 Am. De. 262 (1850); Stephens v. White, 2 Wash. 203 (Va. 1799).
34. See, e.g., Holmes v. Peck, 1 R.I. 242, 245 (1849): "We recognize the
principle, which subjects an Attorney for the want of ordinary skill and
care in the management of the business entrusted to him, as any one else,
who professes any other art or mystery. The want of ordinary care and skill
in such a person is gross negligence."
35. With the cases in note 33, supra, contrast the later decisions in Goodman
& Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857); Hampel-Lawson Merc. Co. v. Poe,
169 Ark. 840, 227 S.W. 29 (1925); Glenn v. Haynes, 191 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509
(1951). In Canada, contrast the earlier case of Marriott v. Martin, 21 B.C. 161,
21 D.L.R. 463 (1915), with Aaron v. Seymour, [1956] Ont. R. 736.
36. The position in England is thus indicated by Sir Alfred Denning, L.J.:
"One hundred years ago the courts said that a solicitor was not liable except
for gross negligence. This phrase has been discarded, but the cases are treated
much the same now as then." Foreword, to EDDY, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
at vii (1955). See, generally, Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CAL. L. REV.
91 (1933).
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In determining whether an ordinary individual is negligent in causing injury to another, the standard of care is usually expressed in a
simple fashion by speaking of what a reasonable prudent person
would do under similar circumstances. 37 The standard in the case of
an attorney is somewhat more complicated. It is composed of at least
two elements and possibly three. The first has to do with the care
and diligence which he must exercise. The second is concerned with
the minimum degree of skill and knowledge which he must display.
The third may involve any additional skill which he may himself possess. The three are aptly combined in a statement from the recent
North Carolina case of Hodges v. Carter,38 that a lawyer
is answerable in damages for any loss to his client which proximately results from a want of that degree of knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed by others of his profession similarly situated, or from the omission
to use reasonable care and diligence, or from the failure to exercise in
good faith his best judgment in attending to the litigation committed to
his care.
An earlier statement quoted on a number of occasions and probably
used in instructions to juries is the following from Spangler v. Sellers:39

It did not require of him the possession of perfect legal knowledge, and
the highest degree of skill in relation to business of that character, nor
that he would conduct it with the greatest degree of diligence, care, and
prudence. But it required that he should possess the ordinary legal
knowledge and skill common to members of the profession; and that, in
the discharge of the duties he had assumed, he would be ordinarily and
reasonably diligent, careful, and prudent.
Other expressions vary the idea somewhat. Thus: An attorney
should use "such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment." 40 An attorney is held "to use a reasonable degree of
37. This derives, of course, from the famous case of Blyth v. Birmingham
Waterworks, 11 Exch. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex. 1856). See generally
PROSSER, TORTS, § 31 (2d ed. 1955).
38. 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1954).
39. 5 Fed. 882, 887 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881).
40. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879); Hampel-Lawson Merc. Co. v. Poe, 169 Ark. 840, 227 S.W. 29, 34 (1925); cf. Morrison v.
Burnett, 56 Ill. App. 129, 135 (1849) ("such skill and prudence as lawyers of
ordinary ability and care would exercise"). The Restatement speaks of the
"skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or
trade in good standing" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ToRTs, § 299A (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1959). It explains that the term "average" is inaccurate since this would
disqualify half of the profession. Id., comment d.
References are usually to lawyers in general or the normal lawyer. Unlike
the situation in the medical profession there is little reference to lawyers
in a similar community. One clear reference is in the early case of Pitt v.
Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 2061, 98 Eng. Rep. 74, 75 (K.B. 1767), where Lord
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care or skill and to possess to a reasonable extent the knowledge
requisite to a proper performance of his duties."41 A client "has a
right to the exercise ... of ordinary care and diligence in the execution of the business entrusted to him, and to a fair average degree of
professional skill and knowledge." 4 One court has recently declared
that the "diligence required of an attorney is such as a man of ordinary prudence gives to his own business. '43 Occasionally language
will be used which seems to suggest that the standard is subjective
rather than objective in nature.4
In applying the part of the standard involving knowledge and skill
the courts have declared that it is negligence not to know a rule of
law which is clearly defined, either in the textbooks or the court decisions45 or not to "understand the leading and fundamental principles
''
of the Common Law."
So also if the rule is clearly set out in the
47
statute, even though recently adopted.48
On the other hand if the state of the law is uncertain or doubtful,
or if there is disagreement among attorneys then it is very unlikely
that an attorney will be found negligent. 49 In this connection, it may
Mansfield said, "they were country attornies; and might not, and probably
did not know that this point was settled here above." See also WEEKS, ArroRNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT LAW, § 289 (2d ed., 1892); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS, § 299A, comment f (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959).

41. Clinton v. Miller, 124 Mont. 463, 226 P.2d 487, 498 (1951); cf. Cox v.
Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144, 148 (1849) ("employment of a degree of skill ordinarily
adequate and proportioned to the business he assumes").
42. Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 Atl. 698, 701 (1889).
43. Williams v.Knox, 10 N. J. Super. 384, 76 A.2d 712, 715 (1950).
44. E.g., Stevens v. Walker & Dexter, 55 Ill. 151, 153 (1870): "If the attorney
acts with a proper degree of attention, with reasonable care, and to the best
of his skill and knowledge, he will not be held responsible." Compare the
statement of the California court in a disciplinary proceeding: "he must
perform his duties to the best of his individual ability, not the standard
of ability required of lawyers generally in the community." Friday v. State
Bar, 23 Cal. 2d 501, 144 P.2d 564, 567 (1943).
45. Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857).
46. In re A. B.'s Estate, 1 Tuck. 247 '(N.Y. Surr. 1866); cf. Trimboli v.
Kinkel, 226 N.Y. 147, 123 N.E. 205, 206 (1919) ("It is negligence to fail to
apply the settled rules of law that should be known to all conveyancers").
47. W. L. Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d 841 (1933)
(error of law no excuse, "as a mere glance at the statute would have been
sufficient to convince him of his error"); Jones v. White, 90 Ind. 255 (1883).
In England a solicitor may not be required to know all the statutes but he
must know the important ones. See Fletcher & Son v. Jubb, Booth & Helliwell, [1920] 1 K.B. 275 (C.A.).
48. In re A. B.'s Estate, 1 Tuck. 247 (N.Y. Surr. 1866) ("cannot be excused
for ignorance of the public statutes of the state"). But cf. Citizens' Loan,
Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedey, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890).
49. See, e.g., Citizens' Loan, Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23
N.E. 1075 (1890); Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 353 (La. 1821); Rapuzzi
v. Stetson, 160 App. Div. 150, 145 N.Y.S. 455 (3d Dep't 1914) (court of appeals
had voted 4 to 3 on the issue); Gimbel v. Waldman, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 888 (Sup. Ct.
1948); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E. 2d 144 (1954); Stevenson v.
Howand, 2 Dow. & C. 104, 6 Eng. Rep. 668 (H.L.Sc. 1830); Baikie v. Chandless,
3 Camp. 17, 170 Eng. Rep. 1291 (N.P. 1811).
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be relevant that the lower court agreed with the attorney 0 or that
he sought the advice of another attorney before taking his action.5 1
It is to be expected that one who holds himself out as a specialist
will be held to the legal skill and knowledge common among such
52
specialists.
As to the knowledge which is required of foreign law, a difference
of viewpoint exists. The New Jersey court declares that an attorney is
"not to be presumed to know the laws of a foreign state." 53 The New
York court's position is that "when a lawyer undertakes to prepare
papers to be filed in a state foreign to his place of practice, it is his
duty, if he has no knowledge of the statutes, to inform himself, for,
like any artisan, by undertaking the work; he represents that he is
capable of performing it in a skillful manner."5 4 The second position
seems clearly preferable, but a decision should of course depend upon
the scope of the defendant's undertaking.S5
As in the case of the medical profession the indication is that a lawyer is not liable in the exercise of discretion as to the better way to
50. Cf. Hart v. Frame, 6 Cl. & F. 193, 7 Eng. Rep. 670 (H.L.Sc. 1839) (if
there had been any real doubt as to the law the magistrate's original decision
would have been controlling). But cf. Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal. App.
677, 283 P. 871 (1929) (error in drawing up findings, which trial judge failed
to discover). "When a lawyer yields to the opinion of the presiding judge, in
reference to such a question, and forbears to take an exception, he cannot be
convicted of a want of professional skill, professional knowledge, or professional diligence." Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 227, 259 (1858). An attorney
is not liable for advising his client in accordance with an appellate decision,
even though the decision is later overruled. Taylor v. Robertson, 31 Can.
Sup. Ct. 615 (1901).
51. Cf. Watson v. Muirhead, 57 Pa. St. 161 (1868); Godefroy v. Dalton, 6
Bing. 460, 130 Eng. Rep. 1357 (C.P. 1830). But cf. Goodman & Mitchell v.
Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857); Herr v. Toms, 32 U.C.Q.B. 423 (1872).
52. See Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19 BROOKLYN L. REV. 233, 254 (1953); Holdridge, Malpractice of Patent
Attorneys, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 345 (1957); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS,
§ 299A, Comment c, (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959).
53. Fenaille & Despeaux v. Coudert, 44 N.J.L. 286, 291 (1882): "It could
hardly be contended that the attorney who is employed to draw an agreement affecting one of our immense railways, traversing a dozen states and
territories, impliedly holds himself out as familiar with the laws of each.
In such a case the prudent client submits the contract to professional gentlemen of each state." The difficulty here lay not with the content of a contract
drawn by the defendants, but with a failure to have it filed correctly; and
there was indication that this was outside the scope of the defendants' employment.
54. Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814 (Ist Dep't
1922). The opinion continues: "Not to do so, and to prepare documents that
have no legal potency, by reason of their lack of compliance with simple
statutory requirements, is such a negligent discharge of his duty to his client
as should render him liable for loss sustained by reason of such negligence.
...If the attorney is not competent to skillfully and properly perform the
work, he should not undertake the service."
55. On the effect of an attorney's utilization of another attorney in the
foreign state, see Wildeman v. Wachtell, 149 Misc. 623, 267 N.Y.S. 840, 841
(Sup. Ct. 1933) ("A lawyer should not be held to a stricter rule in foreign
matters than the exercise of due care in recommending a foreign attorney').
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proceed or for a simple error of judgment.56 On the other hand, if
"there are two ways of doing a thing, and one is clearly right and the
other is doubtful, to do it in the doubtful way" may be held to constitute negligence. 57 When an attorney "departs from the ordinary
mode" of accomplishing an object and resorts to an unusual method, it
has been suggested that "in so doing he must be considered as undertaking to do what was necessary to render the mode which he adopted
effectual for its purpose; and if, whether from ignorance or inadvertance, he failed to do so, he must be held responsible for the
consequences." 58
One factor to be considered in applying the standard regarding skill
and knowledge is whether the attorney is "called on to act at once,
and without time for reflection," 59 or whether he has an opportunity
to look up the law and to plan his course of procedure.
An important distinction is drawn in the case of Byrnes v. Palmer.60
While the same standard of care is expressed for various activities of
an attorney, the application may vary.
In a litigation a lawyer is well warranted in taking chances.... The
conduct of a lawsuit involves questions of judgment and discretion, as
to which even the most distinguished members of the profession may
differ. They often present subtle and doubtful questions of law. If in
such cases a lawyer errs on a question not elementary or conclusively
settled by authority, that error is one of judgment, for which he is not
liable. But passing titles, as a rule, is of an entirely different nature. A
purchaser of real estate is entitled not only to a good but to a marketable,
title.... It is therefore the duty of a conveyancer to see that his client obtains a marketable title, and to reject titles involved in doubt, unless the
client is fully informed of the nature of the risk and is willing to accept it.
A careful lawyer might readily advise a client that he was entitled to a
piece of real property, and that it was proper to bring an action for its
recovery, while at the same time he would unhesitantly reject a title
which involved the same question as to which he advised a suit.61

This distinction, letting the application of the standard depend upon
what the attorney is undertaking to do, deserves a wider considera62
tion by the courts.
56. See, e.g., Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 (1954); Morgan
v. Giddings, 1 S.W. 369, 370 (Tex. 1886); Hart v. Frame, 6 Cl. & F. 193, 210,
7 Eng. Rep. 670 (H.L.Sc. 1839).
57. Levy v. Spyers, 1 F. & F. 3, 5 n. (a), 175 Eng. Rep. 599 (N.P. 1860).

58. Stevenson v. Howand, 2 Dow. & C. 104, 119, 6 Eng. Rep. 668, 674 (H.L.Sc.

1830).; see also Carrigan v. Andrews, 6 N.B. 485 (1849). Contrast Simmons v.
Pennington & Son, [1955] 1 All E.R. 240 (C.A.), where solicitors used the
customary method of answering a requisition on title. When this was held
subsequently to be erroneous and to change the legal status of the parties,
the solicitors were held not negligent.
59. Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 353, 374 (La. 1821).
60. 18 App. Div. 1, 45 N.Y.S. 479 (2d Dep't 1897).
61. 45 N.Y.S. at 481-82. In Levy v. Spyers, 1 F. & F. 3, 175 Eng. Rep. 599
(N.P. 1860), it is specifically held not to be negligence to sue when it is

doubtful whether there can be recovery, even though the suit is lost.
62. It is quoted in 1
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whether an attorney has breached the standard of
as one of fact for the jury.6 3 Occasionally there are
would seem to indicate that the application of the
treated as a question of law to be decided by the

court,64 but they have been rare. The burden of proof, of course, is
65

on the plaintiff.
In the case of a negligence action against a physician, it is the general rule that expert testimony of other doctors is required to give
the jury a basis for making a determination. No such requirement
appears to-have developed in actions against attorneys, though testimony of other attorneys is normally received as relevant and helpful
66
evidence.
There is no indication of application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to attorney-negligence cases. 67 Since the attorney does not
guarantee results, the fact that a case is lost or that a title proves
invalid does not constitute evidence of negligence.6 8 Evidence as to
Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19
BROOKLYN L. REV. 233, 244-45 (1953).

63. E.g., O'Neill v. Gray, 30 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1929); Walker v. Goodman &
Mitchell, 21 Ala. 647, 650 (1852) ("The degree of negligence necessary to
charge him is a question of fact for the jury"); Hampel-Lawson Mere. Co.
v. Poe, 169 Ark. 840, 227 S.W. 29 (1925) (lower court improperly passed on
the issue as matter of law); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 Atl. 698 (1889);
Parker-Smith v. Prince Mfg. Co., 158 N.Y.S. 346 (2d Dep't 1916); Stein v.
Kremer, 112 N.Y.S. 1087 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Mercer v. King, 1 F. & F. 490,
175 Eng. Rep. 822 (N.P. 1859).
64. See Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542, 552 (1872) ("In actions of this character against attorneys ....

when the facts are ascertained, the question of

negligence or want of skill is a question of law for the Court"); Gimbel v.
Waldman, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 888, 891 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ("no question of fact is in-

volved but.., the matter is one of pure law and ... it would be improper
to submit to a jury of lay persons the question whether the advice was correct, or, if incorrect, whether in view of the state of the law on the subject
the defendant was guilty of negligence").
65. E.g., McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 115 N.W. 481 (1917); Powys v.
Brown, 25 N.S.W. St. 65 (1924). When the controversy relates to the good
faith or fraudulent conduct of an attorney, because of the fiduciary relationship with his client, he may be under the burden of showing the validity of a
transaction. This does not apply, however, to an action for negligence. Priest
v. Dodsworth, 235 Ill. 613, 85 N.E. 940 (1908).
66. E.g., Pennington's Ex'rs v. Yell, 11 Ark. 212, 227 (1850) (negligence "is
a question of fact to be determined by the jury, and is sometimes to be ascertained by the evidence of those who are conversant with and skilled in the
same kind of business . . ."); Olsen v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934);
Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 Atl. 698 (1889); Godefroy v. Dalton, 6
Bing. 460, 130 Eng. Rep. 1357 (C.P. 1830); Fletcher v. Winter, 3 F. & F. 138,
176 Eng. Rep. 62 (N.P. 1862). But cf. Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872)
(whether defendant was negligent was a question for the court, not the witness to decide). In Livingston v. Cox, 8 Watts & S. 61 (Pa. 1844), it was held
that evidence of another attorney was not admissible as to negligence when
the "proper exercise of such discretion depends not on technical skill."
67. In Olsen v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934), the court specifically indicates
that the doctrine is not applicable.
68. 'Failure of success in a law suit is not prima facie evidence of negligence or want of proper skill." Seymour v. Cogger, 13 Hun 29, 33 (N.Y. App.
1878). "The mere fact that a complaint turns out to be demurrable does not
show that the attorney who prepared it was incompetent or negligent. If he
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what the attorney did to lose a case (e.g., failed to file a pleading in
time) or why a title was invalid (e.g., misinterpretation of the effect
of a clause in a will) will be direct evidence of negligence. 69 This type
of evidence should be present in any case where the plaintiff is seeking to prove negligence.
The doctrine of negligence per se has not arisen in suits against attorneys, with the possible exception of the situation where a person
is practicing without a license and is therefore in violation of a
70
statute.
Being normally a matter for the jury, application of the standard
of care to specific fact situations is not subject to detailed analysis and
discussion. Some factual groupings of the cases, however, may prove
useful.
Thus in connection with the conduct of litigation 7 l or the collection
of an obligation,7 2 an attorney has been held negligent in the following
respects: unreasonable delay in bringing suit, especially if the statute
of limitations runs; 73 error in the pleadings; 74 suit in the wrong
court;7 5 suit on the wrong theory;7 6 improper service on the defendant,7 7 or failure to persist in seeking to obtain service on him;78 failure

sets out the facts of the plaintiff's case fully and in proper form, and the
question whether they constitute a cause of action or not is fairly debatable,
and after being so advised his client desires to obtain the decision of the
court thereon, the attorney is justified in proceeding with the suit." Kissam v.
Bremerman, 44 App. Div. 588, 61 N.Y.S. 75, 77 (2d Dep't 1899). Cf. Chapman
v. Boultbee, 13 U.C.C.P. 372 (1863) (fact that capias was set aside for irregularity not proof of negligence without proof of irregularity).
69. The record of the first case would be admissible in evidence to show
why it was dismissed. Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435 (1868); Eccles v.
Stephenson, 6 Ky. 517 (1814).
70. See Biakanja v. Irving, 310 P.2d 63 (Cal. App. 1957), where liability
was placed on this basis. The option was vacated by the Supreme Court
in 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), but this aspect of the opinion was not
disapproved.
71. See generally 1 THORNTON, ATT"ORNEYS AT LAW, §§ 319-25 (1924).
72. Id. at §§ 326-30.
73. Fletcher & Son v. Jubb, Booth & Helliwell, [1920] 1 K.B. 275 (C.A.)
(failure to call statute of limitations to attention of client); cf. Lally v. Krester,
177 Cal. 783, 171 P. 961 (1918) (delay caused dismissal; liable); Niosi v.
Aiello, 69 A.2d 57 (Mun. App. D.C. 1949) (not liable; no causation); ParkerSmith v. Prince Mfg. Co., 158 N.Y.S. 346 (2d Dep't 1916). Stevens v. Walker
& Dexter, 55 Ill. 151 (1870) (unreasonable delay); Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr.
2060, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767).
74. Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857); Jones v. White, 90
Ind. 255 (1883) (replevin bond; liable); Rapuzzi v. Stetson, 160 App. Div.
150, 145 N.Y.S. 455 (3d Dep't 1914) (not negligent).
75. Breedlove v. Turner, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 352 (La. 1821); Williams v. Gibbs, 5
Ad. & E.208, 111 Eng. Rep. 1144 (K.B. 1836).
76. Hart v. Frame, 6 Cl. & F. 193, 7 Eng. Rep. 670 (H. L. Sc. 1839).
77. Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435 (1868); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517,
80 S.E.2d 144 (1954) (not liable; doubtful legal question).
78. Dearborn v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 316 (1818).
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to attach a lien on a debtor's interest in time;79 allowing a case to go
by default;8 0 error in affidavit or publication of notice of sale; 81 arranging for witnesses; 82 conduct of trial in general; 83 preparing trial
findings and court orders, 84 arranging for the entry and enrollment of
judgment;85 actions to collect judgment; 86 distribution of funds refor appeal;8 and for failure to follow
ceived; 87 making arrangements
89
client's instructions.
An attorney has been held for erroneous advice as to legal liability90
and as to the settling of litigation 91-similarly for advice93as to the condition of the title to property 92 and advice to a trustee.
An attorney who had drafted instruments has been held liable when
a contract was not enforceable, 94 when he failed to advise as to the
effect of the contract, 95 and when he failed to record the instrument
properly.9 He has also been held for failure to see that a will was
79. Orr v. Waldorf-Astoria Hotel Co., 291 Fed. 343 (8th Cir. 1923); Foulks
v. Falls, 91 Ind. 315 (1883) (not liable).
80. Grayson v. Wilkinson, 13 Miss. 268 (1845); cf. Hill v. Finney, 4 F. & F.
616, 176 Eng. Rep. 616 (N.P. 1865); Vail v. Duggan, 7 U.C.Q.B. 568 (1851) (not
negligence to fail to urge an unconscientious defense).
81. Wilsont v. Carroll, 80 Colo. 234, 250 Pac. 555 (1926).
82. Mercer v. King, 1 F. & F. 490, 175 Eng. Rep. 822 (N.P. 1859) (jury question).
83. Olsen v. North, 276 Il. App. 457 (1934) (not liable).
84. Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal. App. 627, 283 Pac. 871 (1929) (liable;
fact that trial judge approved no excuse); Morrison v. Burnett, 56 Ill. App.
129 (1894) (not liable).
85. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Holliday, 73 Fla. 269, 74 So. 479 (1917).
86. Evans v. Watrous, 2 Port. 205 (Ala. 1835); Pennington's Ex'r v. Yell, 11
Ark. 212, 52 Am. Dec. 262 (1850) (surety on bond).
87. Ramage v. Cohn, 124 Pa. Super. 525, 189 Atl. 496 (1937) (jury question).
88. Spangler v. Sellers, 5 Fed. 882 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881) (not liable; no
cause); General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Cosgrove, 259 Wis. 25, 42
N.W.2d 155 (1950) (not liable; lack of causal proof).
89. Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 171 Pac. 96 (1918); Gilbert v. Williams,
8 Mass. 51 (1811); Ramage v. Cohn, 124 Pa. Super. 525, 189 Atl. 496 (1937)
(jury question).
90. Gimbel v. Waldman, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (not liable).
91. Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 Atl. 698 (1889); In re A.B.'s Estate,
1 Tuck. 247 (N.Y. 1866) (advice based on erroneous knowledge of statute).
92. Hill v. Cloud, 48 Ga. App. 506, 173 S.E. 190 (1934) (outstanding lien),
Citizens' Loan, Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 107d
(1890) (not liable); Bayerl v. Smyth, 117 N.J.L. 412, 189 Atl. 93 (1937); Trimboll v. Kinkel, 226 N.Y. 147, 123 N.E. 205 (1916); cf. Otter v. Church, Adams,
Tatham & Co., [1953] Ch. 280 (failure to advise client that his title was entailed).
93. Flynn v. Judge, 149 App. Div. 278, 133 N.Y.S. 794 (2d Dep't 1912) (liability depends on causation); cf. McGregor v. White, 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d
624 (1931). On giving advice in general, see 1 THORNToN, ATToRNEYS AT LAW,
§ 315 (1914).
94. Fabry v. Joy, 104 N.J.L. 617, 141 Atl. 780 (1928); Stein v. Kremer, 112
N.Y.S. 1087 (Sup. Ct. 1908) (contract determinable at will; question for jury).
95. Fowler v. American Fed. of Tobacco Growers, Inc., 195 Va. 770, 80 S.E.2d
554 (1954); Stannard v. Ullithorne, 10 Bing. 491, 131 Eng. Rep. 985 (C.P. 1834);
cf. Yager v. Fishman & Co., [1944] 1 All E.R. 552 (C.A.) (no duty to remind
client that date for giving notice for exercise of option was passing).
96. Hampel-Lawson Merc. Co. v. Poe, 169 Ark. 840, 227 S.W. 29 (1927) (jury
question).
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98
properly attested, 97 for an improper acknowledgment or affidavit,
99
and for errors in the preparation of the accounts of an estate.

CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP
In order to recover in a negligence action against an attorney it is
necessary to show that his negligence was the cause of legal damage
to the client. In many situations this presents no real problem. Thus,
if the attorney overlooked an outstanding lien in approving an abstract, his negligence is the cause of plaintiff's being subjected to this
lien; 100 if he drew up a contract which was unenforceable, his negligence is the cause of plaintiff's loss in being unable to enforce the
contract. 10'
When the negligence is in giving advice, the question sometimes
arises as to whether his advice was the reason for the plaintiff's conduct. The phrase "sole proximate cause" has sometimes been relied
on by a defendant in urging that if there were any other basis for
plaintiff's action the court cannot hold the defendant liable. Two recent Pacific coast cases repudiate this argument and hold that if the
defendant's erroneous advice was "a proximate cause of the injury"
recovery can be had.10 2
It is in connection with negligence in the conduct of litigation that
the question of causation has presented its most difficult problems.
Here the rule has developed that when the client lost his case he
must show not only that the attorney was negligent but also that the
result would have been different except for the negligence. In other
words, this involves a "suit within a suit,"'1 3 and the client must show
that he would have won the first suit as one step in order to win the
second one.
If the original action was lost, the client must show that the original
claim was a sound one and that he was entitled to recover on it.1 °4 If
97. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).

98. Morris v. Muller, 113 N.J.L. 46, 172 Ati. 63 (1934) (jury question);
Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y.S. 810 (1st Dep't 1922).
99. Thompson v. Lobdell, 7 Rob. 369 (La. 1844). On drafting instruments in
general, see 1 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, § 317 (1914).
100. See Hill v. Cloud, 48 Ga. App. 506, 173 S.E. 190 (1934); cf. Otter v.
Church, Adams, Tatham & Co., [1953] Ch. 280, where defendants negligently
advised a guardian that his ward was absolutely entitled to certain property
when he held it in tail male. When he died without taking steps to make it
his own absolutely, the damage was the value of the likelihood that he would
have done so.
101. Cf. Fabry v. Joy, 104 N.J.L. 617, 141 Atl. 780 (1928).
102. Modica v. Crist, 120 Cal. 2d 144, 146, 276 P.2d 614 (1954); cf. Ward v.
Arnold, 328 P.2d 164, 166 (Wash. 1958) ("the law does not require that negligence of the defendant must be the sole cause .... We see no sound reason
. . . why the degree of causation which must be proved in an action for

damages for malpractice should be any different from that required in an
ordinary negligence case").
103. See Coggin, Attorney Negligence-A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L.
REv.225 (1958).
104. Piper v. Green, 216 Ill. App. 590 (1920); Eccles v. Stephenson, 6 Ky.
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the defense was negligently not presented in the original action, the
client must show that it was a valid one. 105 Even if the original cause
of action was a valid one, it has been held that there can be no recovery if the original defendant was insolvent so that the judgment
would have been valueless. 0 6
If the original action was lost and the attorney negligently failed to
effect an appeal, the client must show that the appeal would have been
sustained. 0 7 In Pete v. Henderson,0 8 the trial court had refused to
allow the client to introduce proof that the appeal would have been
effective on the ground that the first action was now final and could
be attacked only by appeal so that this court was without power to
determine what might have happened on appeal. This was reversed
by the appellate court, which reasoned that this would not constitute
a collateral attack on the original judgment, since it is final as between
the parties and the purpose of the instant action was not to reverse it.
Plaintiff here is trying to recover damages from his attorney, not a
party to the first action. For this reason, the trial judge could be
called on to determine if an appeal would have been successful. 10
The burden of proof on the issue of causation is on the plaintiff.
Some of the earlier cases indicated that if an attorney lost a case by
his negligence he must show that the cause of action or the defense
was invalid; 110 but the law seems clearly established now that the
plaintiff has the burden."' He must be sure to include the allegation
in his bill of complaint.1 2
517 (1814); Spiller v. Davidson, 4 La. Ann. 171 (1849); Niosi v. Aiello, 69
A.2d 571 (Mun. App. D. C. 1949); Scott v. McCarter, West. L. Rep. 228 (B.C.

1908); cf. Wade v. Ball, 20 U.C.C.P. 302 (1870) (failure to obtain witness does

not sustain cause of action unless witness' testimony would have caused different result). But cf. Lichow & Sowers, 334 Pa. 353, 6 A.2d 285 (1939).
105. Roehl v. Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405 (Mo. App. 1935); cf. Haggerty v. Watson,
302 N.Y. 707, 98 N.E.2d 586 (1951).
106. Lawson v. Sigfrid. 83 Colo. 116, 262 Pac. 1018 (1927); cf. Jones v.
Wright, 19 Ga. App. 242, 91 S.E. 265 (1917). But cf. Orr v. Waldorf-Astoria
Hotel Co., 291 Fed. 343 (8th Cir. 1923); Crooker v. Hutchinson, 1 Vt. 73
(1827).
107. Spangler v. Sellers, 5 Fed. 882 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881); Sutton v. Whiteside, 101 Okla. 79, 222 Pac. 974 (1924); General Accident Fire & Life Assur.
Corp. v. Cosgrove, 257 Wis. 25, 42 N.W.2d 155 (1950).
108. 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78, 45 A.L.R.2d 58 (1954).
109. 269 P.2d at 79. The case having been reversed, it was tried again by
the lower court, which held that the appeal would not have been successful.
This was affirmed on appeal. Pete v. Henderson, 155 Cal. App. 2d 722, 318 P.2d
720 (1957). See also Lamprecht v. Bien, 125 App. Div. 811, 110 N.Y.S. 128
(1st Dep't 1908).
110. Grayson v. Wilkinson, 13 Miss. 268 (1845); Godefroy v. Jay, 7 Bing.
413, 131 Eng. Rep. 159 (C.P. 1831) ; cf. Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St. 443 (1869);
Gould v. Blanchard, 29 N.S. 361, 364 (1897).
111. See, e.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 Fed. 397 (4th Cir. 1916);
Spangler v. Sellers, 5 Fed. 882, 892 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881); Vooth v. McEachen,
181 N.Y. 28, 73 N.E. 488 (1905); General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v.
Cosgrove, 257 Wis. 25, 42 N.W.2d 155 (1950).
112. See, e.g., Feldesman v. McGovern, 44 Cal. App. 2d 566, 112 P.2d 645
(1941); Jones v. Wright, 19 Ga. App. 242, 91 S.E. 265 (1917).
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In Lally v. Kuster,"3 the defendant attorney delayed prosecuting an
action for the plaintiff so long that the action was dismissed, the judge
making the dismissal on the merits because the delay was to attain an
unfair advantage against the debtor. Since the delay was contrary to
the client's instructions he sued for negligence. Defendant contended
that the dismissal was erroneous and that a rehearing or appeal should
be sought. The supreme court held that the dismissal was properly
granted and gave no consideration to the question of who had the

burden of proof." 4

In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price,"5 defendant insurance company
was under an obligation to defend an action and had extended insurance coverage for $5000. Defendant, attorney for the plaintiff, failed
to enter an appearance and a default judgment was entered for more
than $5000. Plaintiff paid the total amount of the judgment and sued
the defendant. Plaintiff contended that it did not make any difference whether there was a valid defense to the original suit since it
was only because of defendant's negligence that plaintiff was forced
to pay the amount in excess of the $5000 coverage. The court refused
recovery, saying that if there was no defense to the original action the
plaintiff company was under no legal obligation to its insured. It held
that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to prove that the injured
party (plaintiff in the original suit) would not have secured a judgment or would have received a lesser amount had the suit been
defended.
DAMAGES

There is little that is unusual in the law of damages as applied to
negligence suits against attorneys.
The measure of damages is not the amount of the attorney's fee, but
is instead compensation for the injury which the plaintiff received and
may be more or less than the fee; and the burden is on the plaintiff to
6
prove the damages."
If the negligence caused the plaintiff to lose title to property, the
measure of recovery is the value of the property." 7 If it caused the
overlooking of an outstanding lien, the measure is the cost of eliminating the lien." 8
113. 177 Cal. 783, 171 Pac. 961 (1918).

114. Cf. Milton v. Hare, 130 Ore. 590, 280 Pac. 511 (1929), where the suit was
lost and the trial judge, hearing that plaintiff claimed she had not had a fair
opportunity to present her case because of negligence of her attorney, opened
the case up and gave her an additional opportunity to present her side. When
she failed to take advantage of it, this was held to be the basis of her loss.
115. 231 Fed. 397 (4th Cir. 1916).
116. Quinn v. VanPelt, 56 N.Y. 417 (1874). The fee may sometimes be an
element of the damages, as where the plaintiff pays the defendant to take an
appeal and the defendant fails to act. See Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App.
2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954).
117. Whitney v. Abbott, 191 Mass. 59, 77 N.E. 524 (1906).
118. Hill v. Cloud, 48 Ga. App. 506, 173 S.E. 190 (1934) ; Bayerl v. Smith, 117
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If the negligence is in conducting litigation, the measure of damages
is the amount which would have been recovered except for the defendant's negligence. 119 Correspondingly, if the defendant's negligence prevented the use of a good defense, the measure of recovery
120
is the amount of the judgment which the defendant had to pay.
In McGregor v. Wright,'12 plaintiff contended that defendant's negligent advice caused him to be removed as trustee in bankruptcy, and
he sued to recover for the financial loss involved, and for nervous
his reputation. These were all held to be too
shock and for injury to122
remote and speculative.
Some of the early decisions suggested that the plaintiff might recover nominal damages when he proved that the defendant was negligent and failed to show any actual damages.'2 This is inconsistent
with the general rule that actual damages are necessary for a negligence action, however, and has not been the basis of any recent holding.
There are cases indicating that punitive damages can be awarded,
depending on the basis for such damages in the individual jurisdic12 4
tion.
DEFENSES

Statutes of Limitations
The limitation period usually differs for contract and tort actions,
with the period for contracts normally being longer. For this reason,
when the limitation period is at issue, the plaintiff usually elects to
N.J.L. 412, 189 Atl. 93 (1937). In Jacobsen v. Peterson, 91 N.J.L. 404, 103
Atl. 983 (1918), the defendant overlooked a judgment which was a cloud on
title. Plaintiff later sold the property for a sum in excess of the total cost
including the discharge of the judgment lien, and the lower court granted
nominal damages only. The appellate court reversed on the ground that the
measure of damages was not affected by the later sale. "It will not do to say
that in order for a client to recover for such negligence he must either sell
the property at a loss or not sell it at all. He was entitled to all the profit
he would have made by the transaction if the title had been as represented."
103 Atl. at 984.
119. McLellan v. Fuller, 226 Mass. 374, 115 N.W. 481 (1917). The court adds
that interest can also be recovered to make "the plaintiff whole for the delay."
For a more detailed treatment and collection of cases, see Annot., Measure and
Elements of Damages Recoverable for Attorney's Negligence with Respect to
Maintenance or Prosecution of Litigation or Appeal, 45 A.L.R2d 62 (1956).
In Childs v. Comstock, 69 App. Div. 160, 74 N.YS. 643 (1st Dep't 1902), it is
held that there is to be subtracted from the amount that would have been
recovered the part which could have gone to defendant for attorney's fees.
120. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 62,67 (1956).
121. 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931).
122. The authority of the case is somewhat weakened by the fact that the
court did not find a true attorney-client relationship to exist. On loss of
commissions, see Flynn v. Judge, 149 App. Div. 278, 133 N.Y.S. 794 (2d Dep't
1912).
123. E.g., Grayson v. Wilkinson, 13 Miss. 268 (1845); Godefroy v. Jay, 7
Bing. 413, 131 Eng. Rep. 159 (C.P. 1831).
124. Patterson v. Frazier, 79 S.W. 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904); cf. Hill v.
Montgomery, 84 Ill. App. 300 (1899) (deliberate false statement).
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treat his action as contractual in nature, and the courts have usually
125
accepted his choice.
There is disagreement in determining when the statute begins to
run. Some early cases hold that it is from the date of the negligent
conduct, usually on the basis that nominal damages could then be
obtained. 126 Others take the more logical position that the plaintiff
must have suffered actual damage before the limitation period be27
gins.1
Illegality
In Goodman & Mitchell v. Walker 2 8 it was held that the fact that
part of the contract of employment was champertous was not a defense to an action for negligence of the attorney in seeking to collect
on a note. But in Morris v. Muller, 29 where it was urged that defendant was illegally practicing law, the court said that if he was the
plaintiff knew of it and could not recover. "Such a contract is illegal
and void. It directly requires an unlawful act for its performance,
and is contrary to public policy. The court will not lend its aid to
one who founds his cause of action upon an illegal act."'130
Others
Contributory negligence and assumption of risk appear not to have
131
been defenses frequently used in an action for attorney's negligence.
Perhaps engaging a person known not to be qualified to practice law
32
would give rise to such a defense.
Survival statutes normally include many tort actions today, but at
common law it would probably be necessary to bring the action in
contract to prevail. 133 A similar election is sometimes suggested in
order to come within set-off and counterclaim statutes. 34 The action
in tort may be more desirable if a problem of nonjoinder of parties
135
defendant arises.
125. See, e.g., Foulks v. Falls, 91 Ind.315 (1883); Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157
Wash. 172, 288 Pac. 265 (1930). But the election to sue in contract must be
clearly indicated, see Bland v. Smith, 197 Tenn. 683, 277 S.W.2d 377 (1955).
On the application of a statute applying expressly to "malpractice" compare
Galloway v. Hood, 69 Ohio App. 278, 43 N.E.2d 631 (1941), with O'Neill v.
Gray, 30 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1929) (New York statute).

126. E.g., Wilcox v. Plummer, 29 U.S. 172 (1830); Lilly v. Boyd, 72 Ga. 83
(1883).
127. E.g., Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 171 Pac. 961 (1918).
128. 30 Ala. 482 (1857).
129. 113 N.J.L. 46, 172 Atl. 63 (1934).

130. 172 Atl. at 66. On advice to testify to a falsehood, see Flynn v. Judge,
149 App. Div. 278, 133 N.Y.S. 794 (2d Dep't 1912).
131. In Jones v. White, 90 Ind. 255 (1883), the court held that it was not
necessary to aver specifically that the plaintiff was without fault. "Inaverring
the wrongful act of the attorney, and that the loss resulted from it, the plaintiff sufficiently shows that his own act did not contribute to the injury."
132. Cf. Wakeman v. Hazelton, 3 Barb. Ch. 148 (N.Y. 1848).
133. Cf. Stimpson v. Sprague, 6 Me. 470 (1830).
134. Cf. Rooker v. Bruce, 45 Ind. App. 57, 90 N.E. 86 (1909).
135. Cf. Davies v. Lock, 3 L.T. (O.S.) 125 (1844).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

CONCLUSION

The task set for a client who seeks to recover in an action of negligence is a formidable one. He must first find another attorney who
will take his case and prosecute it. This is likely to prove particularly
difficult in some cities, and it may be exaggerated by the need in some
cases for the testimony of other attorneys regarding the character
of the defendant's work. If the charge is negligence in regard to the
conduct of litigation the client is required to win two cases; he must
show both that the defendant was negligent and that plaintiff was
entitled to win the original suit and would have won it except for
the defendant's negligence. He is likely to find the court, whether at
trial or appellate level, sympathetic to the defendant as a colleague at
the Bar. 36 Yet in a quite respectable percentage of the cases the
plaintiff has succeeded. The very human attitude of lawyers and
judges in affording protection to the members of their own profession apparently has seldom produced rank injustice, and has affected
the outcome only in the close cases. During recent years the number
of cases has been fewer than in earlier times. Perhaps this is due to
the adoption of higher standards for admission to the Bar, producing
more uniform compliance with minimum requirements for skill and
competence, and to the use of better systems of law office management. On the other hand, the increasing complexity of the law is
making it more difficult for the lawyer to keep abreast with all of its
ramifications and would perhaps produce a countervailing tendency.
Since the early days attention has been called to the similarities of
negligence suits against lawyers and those against doctors. 137 Perhaps
most general similarity is the circumstance that a judgment against
either a lawyer or a doctor injures him not only because of the dam136. This may, of course, work in exactly the reverse fashion, because a
court which is convinced of the incompetence or chicanery of a fellow lawyer
may feel that one way of vindicating the integrity of the Bar is to allow the
plaintiff to recover.
137. The following statement made to a jury by Chief Justice Tindall in
1838 has been often quoted since that time: "Every person who enters into a
learned profession undertakes to bring to the exercise of it a reasonable degree
of care and skill. He does not undertake, if he is an attorney, that at all events
you shall gain your case, nor does a surgeon undertake that he will perform

a cure; nor does he undertake to use the highest possible degree of skill. There

may be persons who have higher education and greater advantages than he
has, but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonble, and competent degree of
skill.... " Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 Car. & P. 475, 479, 173 Eng. Rep. 581 (N.P.
1838).
Another frequently quoted statement is that of Mitchell, C. J., in Citizens'
Loan, Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890): "Attorneys are very properly held to the same rule of liability for want of
professional skill and diligence in practice, and for erroneous or negligent
advice to those who employ them, as are physicians and surgeons, and other
persons who hold themselves out to the world as possessing skill and qualifications in their respective trades or professions." 23 N.E. at 1075. See also
Olsen v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934).
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ages he must pay but also because of the serious damage to his professional reputation. 13 8 This is exaggerated because of the frequent
and unfortunate use of the term "malpractice" which carries with it
connotations of complete professional incompetency or of intentional
wrongdoing. The term negligence ought not to carry a similar connotation because we are all aware that a competent and skillful person
may make a slip or be forgetful on a single occasion without losing
his professional skill; yet damage to reputation still remains. This
is the reason behind the principle that neither a doctor nor a lawyer
is liable for an error of judgment or an erroneous exercise of discretion. If there is a doubtful construction as to what the law is or
more than one school of thought as to the proper medical practice,
liability is quite unlikely.
Yet there are differences between the two professions. The damage
which the doctor produces by his negligence is normally physical injury; that produced by the lawyer is normally economic loss. Problems as to the ambit of liability-those of proximate cause as distinguished from cause in fact-are potentially more controllable in
the case of the doctor, even without imposing the requirement of
privity of contract. In suits against physicians there is more insistence
on the requirement of expert evidence and more frequent reference to
the standard of skill in the particular community.
From this study certain predictions as to the future may be ventured.
The California case of Biakanja v. Irving'3 may well produce a
number of other holdings breaking away from the rigid requirement
of privity of contract or the relationship of attorney and client between the plaintiff and the defendant. But the courts will proceed
extremely cautiously and are likely to confine the added liability to
third parties who are essentially in the contemplation of the parties
at the time the services are rendered. The suggestions in the Ultramares case' 40 are likely to be controlling here.
The distinction between tort and contract actions when an attorney
is sued for negligence is likely to have less significance in the future.
138. "The courts have no hesitation in holding that mistakes made by car
drivers or employers are visited by damages: but they make allowances for
the mistakes of professional men. They realise that a finding of negligence
against a professional man is a serious matter for him. It is not so much the
money, because he is often insured against it. It is the injury to his reputation
which a finding of negligence involves." Denning, L.J., Foreword to EDDY,
PROFESsIoNAL NEGLIGEN E at vii (1955).

139. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). See discussion supra notes 24-27, and
accompanying text.
140. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). The
case involved the liability of public accountants. For discussion see Hawkins,
ProfessionalNegligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VA'D. L. REv. 797
(1959).
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Perhaps its prime significance will be with statutes of limitation. In
general the actions will be treated as tort actions.
In applying the standard of care more attention will be given to the
type of service the attorney is engaged in rendering. Doubtful construction of a statute or a case may relieve him of liability if he is
engaged in litigation or some other activity where it is proper for
him to test that construction, but it will not if he is drafting an instrument or passing on a title and has the responsibility of avoiding the
need of testing that construction. This is the distinction made by the
New York court in Byrnes v. Palmer,'1 1 quoted earlier.
More attention will probably be given in the future to the need for
expert evidence. In many types of situations, such as letting the statute of limitations run before a suit is filed, no testimony of a lawyer is
needed. When the problem is one of interpretation of law, there is
more likely to be a resort to expert evidence to explain the matter to
the jury. But even here, the judge understands the problem without
such testimony, and there is little likelihood of the adoption of the
rule in the physician cases that expert evidence is required. There is
no real indication, however, that the decision as to negligence will be
treated as one of law, to be determined by the court.
The negligence rules will continue to influence lawyers to play safe
by following usual methods of procedure or using-customary forms
rather than adopting new methods. 14
There is little likelihood of a change in the rules regarding negligence in conducting litigation. After all, one party must always lose
in litigation, and the courts are aware of the fact that many decisions
must be made under pressure of time.
A number of problems remain unsettled. Among the numerous
questions which occur, a few may be listed.
How far will the courts be ready to go in setting up a different
standard of skill for specialists? There has been practically no discussion of this in the cases, but it is certain to arise with increasing
frequency in the future. The analogy to medicine indicates that a
separate standard will be established.
To what extent will specialities affect the services of the ordinary
practitioner. Suppose, for example, that an attorney draws a will for
a client without paying any attention to the tax aspects, with the
result that a substantial tax saving is lost. Will the ordinary practitioner be expected to give consideration to the tax aspects of transac141. 18 App. Div. 1, 45 N.Y.S. 479, 481-82 (2d Dep't 1897). See supra notes
60-61 and accompanying text.
142. Compare the rules in the two cases of Stevenson v. Howand, 2 Dow
& C. 104, 119, 6 Eng. Rep. 668 (H.L.Sc. 1830); and Simmons v. Pennington
& Son, [1955] 1 All E. R. 240 (C.A.). See supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
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tions he conducts, on pain of being found negligent if he simply
ignores them?
To what extent will a continuing attorney-client relationship require an attorney to volunteer suggestions to a client-to practice
prophlactic law, so to speak. Suppose an attorney has drawn a will
for a client, and changed circumstances (e.g., divorce or child born) or
statutory changes (e.g., tax statutes) now indicate that the will should
be modified. If he is still attorney for the client, may he be found
143
negligent in failing to suggest the change?
What effect will the increasing use of attorneys' liability insurance
have on the law? 44 It could perhaps make the courts more ready to
impose liability, but it will also create a stronger and more organized
defense.
There has been comparatively little careful legal writing on the
subject of the liability of an attorney for negligence. 145 Perhaps this
paper, while not containing an exhaustive collection of the cases, will
at least indicate the major problems and lines of authority and provide some analysis of the problems.
143. There is no authority directly in point. Compare the implications in
the following cases: Fowler v. American Fed. of Tobacco Growers, Inc., 195

Va. 770, 80 S.E.2d 554 (1954) (failure to advise as to the effect of a contractliability)-;.Yager v. Fishman & Co., [1944] 1 All E. R. 552 (C.A.) (failure to
notify client of passing-of date for giving notice of exercise of option to review
lease, not liable); Griffith v.-ZE , -ni
[1953] 1 W.L.R. 1424 (C.A.) (attorney,
asked to advise as to remedies as to Workman's Compensation, failed to advise also of common law remedies; held, not liable; dissent by Denning, L.J.).
144. See Anan, Malpractice Insurance for Lawyers, 21 SHINGLE 188 (1958);
64 CASE & COMMENT 12 (Mar. 1959).
145. Texts and treatises which have devoted at least a chapter to the subject include the following: 2 BEVAN, NEGLIGENCE bk. 6, ch. 3 (4th ed. 1928);
CORDERY, LAW RELATING TO SOLICITORS ch. 6 (4th ed. 1935); EDDY, PROFESSIONAL
NEGLIGENCE

ch. 2 (1955); 5 THOMPSON,

NEGLIGENCE

ch. 166 (1905); 1

THORNTON,

ATTORNEYS AT LAW chs. 15, 16 (1914); WEEKS, ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS AT

ch. 12 (2d ed. 1892).
The two leading articles are Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in
New York for Negligence, 19 BROOKLYN L. REv. 233 (1953); and Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 39 (1935). Others inLAW

dude: Coggin, Attorney Negligence-A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv.
225 (1958); Gardner, Atorney's Malpractice, 6

CLEV.-A. L. REV. 264 (1957);
Holdridge, Malpractice of Patent Atorneys, 7 CLEV.-MAR L. REv. 345 (1958);
Smalley, The Lawyer's Liability for Alleged Malpractice, 1946 INS. L. J. [No.
279] 194, 69 N.J.L.J. 265 (1946).
Notes, of varying quality, include the following: Liability of Attorneys for
Negligence, 91 CENT. L.
333 (1920); An Atorney's Liability to His Client,
t.
7 MIA€I L. Q. 511 (1953); Professional Negligence, 1955 ScoTs L. T. 145;
Liability of Atorney for Negligence, 68 U.S.L. REV. 57 (1934); and The Bases
of the Attorney's Liability to His Client for Malpractice, 37 VA. L. REV. 429
(1951).

